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A refugee who gives a small amount of money to a “terrorist
group,”1 or performs cooking or laundry services involuntarily2—
whether or not the United States supports the group’s goals—auto-
matically becomes trapped in a material support web.  The so-
called “material support bar” is one of the grounds for inadmissi-
bility to the United States named in the Immigration and National-
ity Act (“INA” or “the Act”).3  It has the potential to exclude
otherwise eligible non-citizens from asylum, permanent residency,
naturalization, and many other forms of immigration relief.4  Al-
though the purpose of the bar is to exclude persons who actively
support terrorist groups by providing material aid, in reality the
bar excludes far more—leaving victims of terrorist groups, asylum
seekers seeking relief inside the United States, and recognized ref-
ugees outside of the country5 promised resettlement in the United
* The term “cruel distinctions” has its origins in a New York Times editorial
discussing material support.  While the article was published prior to the Secretary of
Homeland Security’s April 27, 2007, Exercise of Authority, the term “cruel
distinctions” still fittingly describes the result—even with an additional waiver
category. See Editorial, Shutting Out Terrorism’s Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at A22
(criticizing the first set of material support waivers: “the administration recently
agreed to consider selective waivers of the material support ban. But the waivers
would apply only if the groups doing the intimidating were not on any of the State
Department’s lists of terrorist organizations. That is a cruel and irrelevant distinction.
Duress is duress, no matter which group coerced the cooperation.”).
** The author would like to thank Professor Andrea McArdle for her support and
enthusiasm for this piece.  She would also like to thank Brent and Nancy Schusheim
for their support given throughout law school as well as her best friend Daniel P.
Monahan.
1 See, e.g., In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 945 (B.I.A. 2006).
2 See, e.g., REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, THE STORIES: REFUGEES HURT BY THE MATERIAL
SUPPORT BAR ON ADMISSION (2006), available at http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/
ms-caseexamples-2006.pdf.
3 Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2008).
4 But see In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 946 (suggesting that the Respondent might
be eligible for deferral of removal under the United Nation’s Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”)).
5 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) distinguishes the term “asylee”
(or “asylum seekers”) and “refugees.”  The distinction is minimal—asylees apply for
asylum status from within the United States; refugees apply for asylum status from
abroad. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1157 with 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42). See also Press Release,
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States6—without relief.
The material support bar in its present incarnation is the
product of several additions made to the INA as part of a legislative
response to the September 11th attacks on the United States.7  The
provision uses extremely broad terms and has no exception for in-
voluntary support to terrorist organizations or even trivial amounts
of support provided in the course of every day bargain and ex-
change.  For years, major non-governmental actors in the asylum
arena have lobbied for legislative reforms, urging that Congress
write duress and de minimis exceptions into the statute.  The gov-
ernment, for the most part, ignored the advocacy groups’ efforts.
In February 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
announced it would issue waivers for refugees who had given sup-
port under duress to unnamed groups of terrorists.8  This waiver
applied to so few refugees9 and made such arbitrary distinctions,10
however, that even the government felt compelled to act more
quickly.  After just two months, the administration of President
George W. Bush issued another waiver—this time for applicants
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Asylum Protection in the United States
(Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/05/AsylumProtection
FactsheetQAApr05.htm.
6 Press Release, Refugee Council USA, Relief Agency Says Material Support Law
Hurts Terror Victims (Sept. 12, 2006); Editorial, Terrorists or Victims?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2006, at A16; Press Release, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs, Kennedy, Lieberman Express Concern on D.H.S. Unfairly Barring Le-
gitimate Refugees from Resettlement (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://hsgac.senate.
gov/public/ (search “kennedy”; then follow “Kennedy, Lieberman Express Concern
on D.H.S. Unfairly Barring Legitimate Refugees from Resettlement” hyperlink) [here-
inafter Press Release, Kennedy, Lieberman].
7 The provision of material support to a terrorist organization has been a ground
for inadmissibility under the INA since the amendment of the Act in 1990.  Pub. L.
No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).  Since its first appearance, however, the provision
has gained increasing significance as it underwent a series of expansions following the
enactment of increasingly restrictive immigration legislation. Following the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), making broad and significant changes to the
material support bar.  Notably, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the terrorist
grounds of admissibility under INA § 212(a)(3)(B), broadening the definition of a
“terrorist organization” and the scope of the term “terrorist activities” under the INA
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272  (2001).  Then, in May 2005, the REAL ID Act, Pub.
L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), was signed into law, broadening the definition of
“terrorist activity” once again. Id.
8 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) designated these groups Tier
III organizations. See infra notes 73–82 and accompanying text.
9 REFUGEE COUNCIL USA & CHURCH WORLD SERV., THE MATERIAL SUPPORT PROB-
LEM: PUNISHING REFUGEE VICTIMS OF TERROR, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.
rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/ms-backgrd-info3-8-07.pdf [hereinafter MATERIAL SUPPORT
PROBLEM].
10 Id.
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who had provided material support to named groups of
terrorists.11
At first blush, the waivers would appear to be a much wel-
comed change for refugees and their advocates; however, they pro-
vide only a slender reed for refugees to rely upon.  Only a
legislative fix that addresses the indiscriminate nature of the mate-
rial support issue will keep genuine refugees out of its web.  As of
2007, there are an estimated 7,000 cases on hold for material sup-
port reasons; the waiver will likely apply to only ten to twenty of
those cases.12  This Comment will help explain the discrepancy be-
tween those figures by illustrating how the waivers (also known as
“exemptions”) are designed to keep the number of refugees admit-
ted to a minimum.  It will briefly present the tangled statutory his-
tory and language leading up to the current material support bar.
This history is helpful in understanding the bar’s expansive reach
and the tensions immigration advocates have faced trying to curb
its reach.  The Comment will then use the facts from the cases of
three applicants previously found ineligible for immigration bene-
fits under material support provisions, In re S-K-,13 Choub v. Gonza-
les,14 and Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft15 to demonstrate the absurd and
arbitrary nature of the exemptions.
I. MATERIAL SUPPORT: A WIDE BAR TO ASYLUM
The first part of this section explains the history of the mate-
rial support provision in the INA.  The second part demonstrates
that the material support provision’s impact is due in part to its
broad applicability to benign acts of support to designated terrorist
groups.
A. Background
The statutory changes to the INA’s material support provision
are largely undefined, in spite of advocacy groups’ efforts to define
it. This lack of specificity has contributed to a narrow interpreta-
tion of the material support provision that ignores the circum-
stances of the asylum seeker’s request.
The passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
11 This dealt with Tier I and II organizations. See infra notes 73–82 and accompa-
nying text.
12 MATERIAL SUPPORT PROBLEM, supra note 9.
13 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941 (B.I.A. 2006).
14 No. 04-74189, 2007 WL 2316919, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2007).
15 385 F.3d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 2004).
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Act (“AEDPA”) in 1996,16 the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001,17 and
the REAL ID Act in 2005,18 changed the material support provi-
sions in the INA.  Its former simple prohibition of material support
to an organization engaged in a “terrorist activity” was transformed
into a complex provision with a heavy burden on the asylum seeker
to disprove the alleged support.19  Each legislative act added more
language to the provision and included a multi-tiered system that
defined the term “foreign terrorist organization.”20 However, de-
spite its length, it failed to define other key terms, most notably the
term “material support.”
Thus, for years, the major non-governmental actors in the asy-
lum field, including Human Rights First,21 Amnesty International,
and the American Immigration Lawyers Association,22 urged the
16 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C.,
28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
17 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C.,
42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
18 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2005).
19 Immigration and Nationality Act §212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2006).  The statute states:
(iv) Engage In Terrorist Activity Defined.—
As used in this Chapter, the term ‘engage in terrorist activity’ means, in
an individual capacity or as a member of an organization—
(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know,
affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, commu-
nications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit,
false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, bi-
ological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training—
(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know,
has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of
clause (vi) or to any member of such an organization; or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), or to any
member of such an organization, unless the actor can demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should
not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist
organization.
Id.
20 See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
21 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED: VICTIMS OF TERRORISM AND
OPPRESSION BARRED FROM ASYLUM 11–12 (2006), available at http://www.humanrights
first.info/pdf/06925-asy-abandon-persecuted.pdf [hereinafter ABANDONING THE
PERSECUTED].
22 See Friends Committee on National Legislation, “Material Support” Rules Misap-
plied to Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Sign-On Letter to Secretary Chertoff (Jan. 6,
2006) available at http://www.chinland.org/statements/mtsp.pdf (urging the Admin-
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legislature to define the parameters of “material support.”  Specifi-
cally, they advocated for legislative reforms to the provision that
would allow for duress and de minimis exceptions to be read or writ-
ten into the statute.23  The Refugee Council USA, a coalition of
twenty-three refugee advocacy groups, specifically called for the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) or the Secretary of
State to adopt an interpretation of material support in which
“[m]aterial support under the threat of death or torture [would]
not be grounds for inadmissibility”24 and called for a statutory ex-
ception if this interpretation would not be adopted explicitly.25
The coalition envisioned the piecemeal adjudication of the duress
exemption only as a short-term solution.26
Many non-governmental organizations also advocated for a de
minimis exception, whereby refugees otherwise eligible for asylum
who gave minimal or insignificant support, such as water, bread, or
an invitation to a purely religious ceremony,27 would not be ex-
cluded from asylum protection.28  They asserted that to interpret
“material support” as constituting any support would, in effect, nul-
istration to develop a legal interpretation of “material support” in line with a “com-
mon sense reading” of the statute).
23 A duress exception would provide a defense analogous to the well-established
duress defense in criminal law.  Duress is a recognized defense to a number of legal
offenses, such as a crime, tort and contractual breach. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
426 (8th ed. 2005).  The Georgetown University Law Center, in its fact-finding report
on the application of the material support bar, contrasted the lack of a duress excep-
tion to material support with the use of a duress defense in criminal law: “[i]n the
criminal context, an individual forced to give money or goods to an armed group
would be considered a victim of criminal extortion, not a participant in the crime
under U.S. criminal law.” GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES: REFUGEE VICTIMS OF THE WAR ON TERROR, 23 n.157 (May 2006) [hereinafter
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES].
24 REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, THE IMPACT OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR: U.S. REFU-
GEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006 AND 2007, 24 (Sept. 2006) [hereinaf-
ter U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS].
25 Id.
26 Id. at 25 (stating that “[i]n the meantime the Administration can and should
recognize and adjudicate duress cases upon including that the applicants have
demonstrated that they meet the statutory definition of refugee”).
27 In Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004), the Third Circuit held that
an alien who set up tents and gave food to members of an undesignated terrorist
organization (where there was a conflicting terrorist organization designation be-
tween the U.S. State and Treasury Departments) provided material support. See also
In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 945 (B.I.A. 2006) (“As the D.H.S. contends, it is cer-
tainly plausible, in light of the decision in Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft and recent amend-
ments to the Act, that the list in section 212(a)(3)(B) was intended to have an
expanded reach and cover virtually all forms of assistance, even small monetary
contributions.”).
28 See, e.g., ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED, supra note 21, at 12.
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lify the term “material” from “material support.”29
Congress was largely unsympathetic toward their concerns.  In
a May 2006 Senate debate, both Democratic and Republican mem-
bers senators questioned the efficacy of the duress defense to mate-
rial support.30  Although individual politicians had responded to
the advocacy campaigns of refugee groups,31 their efforts failed to
address the underlying and ongoing threat posed by the material
support bar to valid refugees.32
Similarly, the BIA and immigration courts were reluctant to
interpret “material support” beyond its narrow, facial meaning.33
Immigration judges took a highly deferential approach to the stat-
ute, interpreting anti-terror legislation narrowly,34 as a possible
consequence of the so-called “purge” of liberal, pro-immigrant
judges from the BIA by the Bush administration in 2003.35  Courts
29 This argument found support in the dissent in Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 301-04.
Judge Fisher noted, “the majority’s holding ignores the plain language of the statute
by reading ‘material’ out of ‘material support[.]’ ” Id.  at 301. Judge Fisher concluded
that the support must be both important and relevant to terrorism. Id. at 301–04.
30 152 CONG. REC. S4952 (2006). Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) asserted:
Kurdish terrorists in Turkey might be admitted under this amendment
because they pose no threat to the United States of America.  Basque
terrorists in Spain might be admitted because they pose no threat to the
United States of America.  Hamas, which poses a deadly threat to Israel,
might be admitted to the United States because they arguably pose no
threat on the face of it to our national security.  So we have an amend-
ment which is very broad and changes really fundamental definitions, in
redefining material support. . . . And to narrow the definition of what is
a terrorist organization, so that organizations which would be consid-
ered terrorist without this amendment but not terrorist under this
amendment, is just not the sort of thing that ought to be done by the
U.S. Senate . . . .
Id. at S4942.
31 See, e.g., Press Release, Kennedy, Lieberman, supra note 6.  Kennedy and Lieber-
man’s letter focuses on D.H.S.’s implementation of the bar and failure to exercise its
waiver authority.  The letter does not attempt to address the need for legislative guide-
lines or amendments.  Moreover, in the current anti-immigration political climate,
Congress has had difficulty passing far less controversial immigration legislation, such
as the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act (introduced to the House in
March 2005).  Any attempt to soften anti-terror legislation would likely stir even
greater public disapproval.  Therefore, the possibility of an amendment to the mate-
rial support provision in the near future looks bleak.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004).
34 See Susan Benesch, Due Process and Decision Making in U.S. Immigration Adjudica-
tion, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 557, 567 (2007).
35 Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Five Veteran B.I.A. Members Forced to Resign, IMMI-
GRANTS’ RTS. UPDATE (June 3, 2003), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/
removpsds/removpsds122.htm (“In a move that some observers called a purge, Bush
administration officials have pressured five of the longest-serving and most ‘pro-immi-
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used statutory construction analysis to dismiss arguments for an ex-
ception to the material support provision,36 particularly arguments
engaging in refugee rights discourse.
In doing so, courts did not steer away from the U.S.-centric
political debate driving the material support ground and were not
inclined to consider international law on refugee rights.  For exam-
ple, in a cursory discussion, the BIA readily dismissed an interpre-
tation of material support articulated in international law
conventions that considers the circumstances under which the ref-
ugee supplied the material support.  In In re S-K-, The BIA rejected
the reasoning advanced in an amicus brief from the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), which urged
material support to be assessed in conjunction with the alien’s
claim of persecution as mandated by the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees Convention.37 In doing so, it undermined
the general concept of international refugee protection at a time
when even the Supreme Court could not deny the United States’s
international obligations regarding the far more controversial issue
grant’ members of the Board of Immigration Appeals to resign, according to a Mar.
12, 2003, Los Angeles Times article.”).
36 See id.
37 In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 943–44 (B.I.A. 2006). The Drafters of the Conven-
tion relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Convention”) made clear that the main
objective of the Convention was to protect refugees qualifying under the Conven-
tion’s refugee definition contained in Article 1A and, therefore, exclusion would oc-
cur only under exceptional circumstances.  The primacy of non-refoulement and the
exceptional circumstances under which it can be disregarded is widely accepted by
the international community.  Article 33 prohibits the return of a refugee in any man-
ner whatsoever where his life or freedom would be threatened, except where there
are reasonable grounds for regarding the refugee as a security danger to the country
or where the refugee has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; see also Doherty, Regional Representative for the
United States and the Caribbean, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Advisory Opinion, 8 (June 15, 2005) (explaining that “the exclusion clauses need to
be interpreted restrictively. . . .  A restrictive view is warranted in view of the serious
possible consequences of exclusion for the applicant.”).
In applying Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, a balance must be struck between
the nature of the alleged offense by the applicant and the degree of persecution
feared.  The notion of balancing is inherent in the fundamental rights character of
non-refoulement and in the cautious language of the Convention itself.  Article 1F
requires the decision maker to exclude the applicant only if he or she has “serious
reasons for considering” that the non-citizen falls under one of the three exclusion
clauses.  1951 Convention, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.  In
practical terms, it requires an inclusion analysis (a determination on whether the ap-
plicant meets the refugee definition criteria) to occur before exclusion.  A decision
maker must first determine whether a person has a well-founded fear of persecution
and then determine whether the crime is so grave that it is necessary to exclude him
or her.
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of the detention of enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay.38 The
court rejected the UNHCR assertion “which indicates that materi-
ality must be assessed in conjunction with the alien’s claim of per-
secution and the question whether or not the alien presents a
present or future danger to the security of the United States.”39
The BIA’s interim decision stated, “[w]e are unaware of any legisla-
tive history which indicates a limitation on the definition of the
term ‘material support[,]’ ”40 and the court read the statute as not
requiring intent to provide support.  The BIA added in a footnote,
“[i]t is also well established that Congress may enact statutes that
conflict with international law.”41  In short, the BIA’s adherence to
a literal reading of the statute trumped international law and pre-
cluded consideration of the international convention’s intent/
causal connection requirement.
Thus, in effect, the material support provision erected a bar to
admission that would be difficult to remove, in part because of the
statutory-construction based reasoning.  This bar has led to cruel
and pernicious results.  For many refugees and asylum seekers, it
means that the very circumstances that form the basis for their
claims of persecution are used against them to deny protection.
B. The Material Support Maze
The remarkably broad language of the material support bar
results in a convoluted maze, trapping refugees in its corridor and
then blocking relief at every turn.  Entering the maze, the bar in-
cludes a list of items that constitute material support—but this list
is non-exhaustive.  Section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) bars “[the provi-
sion of] a safe house, transportation, communication, funds or
other material financial benefit, false documentation or identifica-
tion, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological
weapons), explosives, or training.”42  The BIA has suggested that
38 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (finding the U.S. military
commissions violated Article III of the Geneva Convention); see also The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1890) (stating that, “[i]nternational law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction”).
39 In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 944 (“We thus reject the respondent’s [UNHCR]
assertion that there must be a link between the provision of material support to a
terrorist organization and the intended use by that recipient organization of the assis-
tance to further a terrorist activity.”).
40 Id. at 943.
41 See, e.g., id. at 942, n.7.
42 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2006).
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material support was “intended to have an expanded reach and
cover virtually all forms of assistance.”43  The Third Circuit has fol-
lowed suit, expanding upon the enumerated statutory list to in-
clude handing out food and setting up tents at a religious
congregation that was attended by militants along with regular
members from the community.44  By this logic, “mere support” or
even “tangential support” can replace “material support.”
There are many paths leading into the maze but the pro-
vider–recipient relationship is a compelling example.  The current
application of the material support bar is so broad that it applies to
refugees who “gave support” by mere affiliation or relation to a
known or unknown member of a terrorist group.  This has in-
cluded, for example, refugees who lived in or traveled to areas con-
trolled by non-governmental, armed groups in order to receive
schooling or for work opportunities.45  It includes children who
give support,46 even if the child is obeying the orders of a parent or
guardian affiliated with a terrorist group.47  It also includes adults
who, in their youth, provided support to a terrorist group or
member.48
The provider–recipient relationship, like the type and form of
material support, is also defined broadly under the statute.  Section
212(a)(3)(B) provides three categories of provider–recipient mate-
rial support.49  The provider establishes the first category by giving
any type of support—monetary, domestic, religious, emotional—
that may have “helped” (albeit in some remote way) to further the
recipient’s commission of a terrorist activity.50
The second category51 is more vague and extends to any indi-
vidual the alien “knows, or reasonably should know, has committed
43 In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 945.
44 Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 299–300 (3d Cir. 2004).  Notably, current
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito was in the majority.
45 See generally Nicholas J. Perry, The Breadth and Impact of the Terrorism-Related
Grounds of Inadmissibility of the INA, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, Oct. 2006 [hereinafter
Breadth and Impact]. See also PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, supra note 70; ABANDONING THE
PERSECUTED, supra note 21, at 2.
46 The material support bar may contravene the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child, art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
47 The Harvard clinic documented an eleven-year-old daughter of a Karen Na-
tional Union soldier who drew water for soldiers and her family in 1995. See PRELIMI-
NARY FINDINGS, supra note 70, at 9.
48 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb), 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb) (2006).
49 Id.
50 Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(aa).
51 Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb).
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or plans to commit a terrorist activity.”52  Here, the language of the
statute encompasses the provider’s past, present, and future contri-
butions,53 as well as the recipient’s past, present, and future terror-
ist activity.54  Thus, an applicant may have unwittingly given a
campaign contribution to a group in the past that is implicated in
terrorist activity years later.  The language “reasonably should
know” precludes instances where an alien intended the support to
be used for peaceful means.  As explained by the Ninth Circuit in
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno,55 for instance, a monetary contri-
bution intended for “nonviolent humanitarian” purposes consti-
tutes material support since the donor has no ultimate control over
how the funds are used.56
Furthermore, the recipient need not belong to a terrorist or-
ganization but only to have been linked to a terrorist activity.57
Since the benefit does not have to be linked to a terrorist activity,
remote affiliation with a terrorist member will implicate this
ground for inadmissibility.58  Consequently, those who have “coop-
erated” with terrorist organizations or members in order to flee a
conflict area have been found inadmissible under this ground.59
The third provider-recipient category60 is the catch-all cate-
gory covering any support given to any “terrorist organization,” de-
fined broadly as “a group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which en-
52 Id.
53 PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, supra note 70, at 4 (noting that no consideration is given
to the temporal aspect of the contribution).
54 Breadth and Impact, supra note 45.
55 205 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
56 Id. at 1133–34.  The court noted that:
Material support given to a terrorist organization can be used to pro-
mote the organization’s unlawful activities, regardless of donor intent.
Once the support is given, the donor has no control over how it is
used. . . . [And there is no requirement] that the government . . .
demonstrate a specific intent to aid an organization’s illegal activities
before attaching liability to the donation of funds. Id.
57 Breadth and Impact, supra note 45.
58 Id.
59 THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE CLINIC & INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS CLINIC,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE MATERIAL
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM BAR AS APPLIED TO THE OVERSEAS RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES
FROM BURMA 4 (Feb. 2006) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY FINDINGS].  “[I]f an individual
cooperates with a ‘terrorist’ organization simply to gain passage out of a conflict area
or to flee human rights abuses, he or she is deemed to have participated in ‘terrorist
activity.’” Id.
60 Immigration and Nationality Act §212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc) (2006).
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gages in, [terrorist] activities.”61 This definition is so vague that, as
amici to the BIA in In re S-K- noted, it would include members of
U.S. troops currently stationed in Iraq.62  The statute does not take
into account the political context of the organization63 and, as
such, has included organizations that the United States considers
allies.64
In an editorial to the Miami Herald, Robert Carey, the Vice Presi-
dent of the International Rescue Committee, reasoned that “[i]f John F.
Kennedy were not a U.S. citizen and had to ask for refugee status
in today’s United States, he would be turned back by Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff.”65  This outrageous example
has a real life, present-day corollary.  As Carey pointed out, Cuban
women who brought food and medicine to their imprisoned rela-
tives who, over 40 years ago, fought the Castro regime with equip-
ment and training of the United States are now being denied
access to U.S. resettlement programs.66
The [Cuban] alzados were wiped out by 1966, yet now, eight
presidents later—in the United States, not in Cuba—the DHS is
applying a law that punishes them and those who helped them
although their fear of persecution by Castro’s government is
more than well founded.67
While the Alzados subsequently received non-duress exemp-
tions from Secretary Chertoff,68 the Refugee Council USA asserts
that the material support bar has the potential to reach interna-
tional students, tourists, as well as the 23,418 non-citizens serving in
U.S. Armed Forces, including those “involved in peaceful assem-
blies protesting human rights violations.”69  For now, refugees and
61 § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
62 In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 949 n.15 (B.I.A. 2006) (Osuna, Acting Vice Chair-
man, concurring).
63 U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, supra note 24, at 10.
64 See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text; see also 152 CONG. REC. S4938–39
(daily ed. May 23, 2006) (statement by Sen. Leahy during discussion of the proposed
amendment No. 4117).  As Senator Leahy stated at a Senate debate in May 2006,
“[the provision] defined ‘terrorist organization’ so broadly that groups that are not
engaged in activities against civilians—freedom fighters that the U.S. Government
once provided training and other material support to—like the Montagnards in Viet-
nam—are covered by this broad definition.” Id. See also In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936,
947 (B.I.A. 2006) (Osuna, Acting Vice Chairman, concurring).
65 See Robert Carey, Op-Ed, PATRIOT ACT: Law Lumps Together Terrorists and Vic-
tims, MIAMI HERALD, June 7, 2006, at A23.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See infra note 79.
69 U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, supra note 24, at 55.
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asylum seekers, the most vulnerable of all non-citizen groups, are
trapped in the material support maze.
II. FREED FROM THE WEB OR FURTHER ENTANGLED?
THE SECRETARY’S WAIVERS
On February 26, 2007, after more than two years of advocacy
from non-governmental organizations70 as well as pressure from in-
dividual members of Congress,71 the Secretary of Homeland Secur-
ity, Michael Chertoff, finally exercised his power under the INA to
issue a waiver to the material support bar.72  For advocates who
struggled to make the United States uphold its 1951 Convention
treaty obligation to protect refugees, the Secretary’s announce-
ment seemed like a step in the right direction.  However, the ex-
emption applied only to a small group of refugees—those who
gave material support to a Tier III (or undesignated) terrorist or-
ganization73 “under duress.” Thus, the broad material support bar
starkly contrasted with the narrow applicability of the issued waiv-
ers.  The first section will explore the narrow applicability of mate-
rial support waivers and exemptions offered by the DHS. The
second section highlights the lack of clear procedures for asylum
seekers to obtain a duress-based waiver.
A. A Narrow Waiver to the Material Support Bar
The INA defines Tier III organizations broadly as “a group of
two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages
in, or has a subgroup which engages in, [terrorist] activities.”74  Yet
most refugees seeking a waiver gave support to Tier I or II organi-
zations.75  Tier I organizations include groups designated terrorist
70 See, e.g., REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (2007).
See also ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED, supra note 21, at 1 (“The definitions of [mate-
rial support and terrorist organizations] are so exceedingly broad that the bar is, tragi-
cally, affecting refugees who do not support terrorism at all.”); MATERIAL SUPPORT
PROBLEM, supra note 9 (“Ironically, for many of these refugees, the very circumstances
that form the basis of their refugee or asylum claim have been interpreted in a way
that has made them ineligible for refugee or asylum status in the United States.”);
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS supra note 59; UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 23.
71 Press Release, Kennedy, Lieberman, supra note 6.
72 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2006); Notice of Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 26138 (May 8,
2007) [hereinafter Exercise of Authority].
73 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (2006).
74 Id.
75 Colombians fleeing from the designated terrorist groups FARC and AUC are
the most frequently represented nationalities with cases affected by the material sup-
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organizations by the Secretary of State and listed under section 219
of the Act as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and Tier II organi-
zations include groups on the State Department’s list of terrorist
organizations published in the Federal Register.76  There are cur-
rently forty-two designated groups on this list, including the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”), the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), and the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People’s Army (“CPP/NPA”).77  Associational
links to these groups alone account for the largest groups of refu-
gees currently affected by the material support bar.78
In addition to the duress exemption, the Secretary declared
that the material support provision would no longer bar applicants
who provided material support to one of eight specific Tier III ter-
rorist organizations.79  This second category of waivers, what the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)
calls “group-based exemptions,” unlike the “duress exemption” cat-
egory, applies to applicants who provided support to one of the
eight listed organizations “regardless of whether the support was
provided under duress.”80  Notably, none of the Tier I and II orga-
nizations listed above were on the list.
While the Secretary claims to have based his determination on
port bar. See Asylum Headquarters/NGO Liaison Meeting, Boston, MA (Mar. 6,
2007) (on file with the author).
76 Under § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I), an entity is a terrorist organization if listed under
section 219 of the Act, which generally refers to foreign organizations that the Secre-
tary has found to threaten the security of the United States.  8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I) (2006).  Secondly, § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) covers any organiza-
tion listed in the Federal Register as a terrorist organization.  8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) (2006).  And, thirdly, under § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) a group
of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a
subgroup which engages in, activities deemed “terrorist activities.”  8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (2006).
77 Fact Sheet, Office of Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm.
78 Asylum Headquarters/NGO Liaison Meeting, supra note 75.
79 Those eight organizations are: (1) Karen National Union/Karen National Lib-
eration Army; (2) Chin National Front/Chin National Army; (3) Chin National
League for Democracy; (4) Kayan New Land Party; (5) Arakan Liberation Party; (6)
Tibetan Mustangs; (7) Cuban Alzados; and (8) Karenni National Progressive Party.
Michael J. Garcia & Ruth E. Wasem, Congressional Research Service, Immigration:
Terrorist Grounds for Exclusion and Removal of Aliens (2008), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
homesec/RL32564.pdf.
80 Interoffice Memorandum from Jonathan Scharfen, Deputy Dir., United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services to Associate Directors, USCIS, Processing the
Discretionary Exemptions to the Inadmissibility Ground for Providing Material Sup-
port to Certain Terrorist Organizations (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.uscis.
gov/files/pressrelease/MaterialSupport_24May07.pdf [hereinafter USCIS Memoran-
dum, May].
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“an assessment related to national security and foreign policy inter-
ests,”81 his policy rationale seemed to have more to do with limiting
the number of refugees admitted into the country than with na-
tional security concerns.82  For advocates, this raised more ques-
tions than answers.83  Why did the waiver apply to refugees who
gave material support to Tier III organizations but not to similarly
situated refugees who gave support to Tier I and II organizations?
Why was duress required for material support given to “Tier III”
terrorist organizations generally but not for the eight specifically
named organizations?  How and when could asylum seekers and
refugees apply for a waiver?
On April 27, 2007, only two months after his first pronounce-
ment, Secretary Chertoff exercised his authority once again by
opening up the waiver to Tier I and II organizations.84 The pro-
nouncement expanded the exemption to all categories of terrorist
organizations and used the exact same language as the first Exer-
cise of Authority.85  Like its Tier III predecessor, the waivers of sup-
port to Tier I and II organizations appeared generous, considering
that only a year before there was no waiver of any sort.  However,
nearly a year after their issuance, the waivers have failed to have a
substantive impact.
Under the former incarnation of the material support bar, the
DHS put hundreds of affirmative asylum applications on hold, de-
taining legitimate asylum seekers and separating families.86  In Feb-
81 Exercise of Authority, supra note 72.
82 Refugee statistics greatly support this contention.  Colombian refugees, for in-
stance, make up the second largest refugee group in the world. See Population Levels
and Trends, 2005 UNHCR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 26, available at http://www.UNHCR.
org/statistics/STATISTICS/464049e53.pdf (“Colombians were the second largest dis-
placed population at the end of 2005 (2.5 million or 12 percent of the total) . . . .”).
Yet, in 2006, the United States resettled a little over 100 Colombian refugees, as over
seventy percent of Colombian refugees who would otherwise be suitable for resettle-
ment were barred because of material support issues. REFUGEE COUNSEL USA, THE
ONGOING CRISIS FOR COLOMBIAN REFUGEES (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://www.
rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/ms-summ-colomref3-5-07.pdf.
[I]n spite of the changes recently announced by the Administration,
Colombians will continue to be excluded from U.S. Resettlement and
asylum programs, because the duress exception announced by the Ad-
ministration will not apply to those who have been victimized by the
FARC or other groups terrorizing Colombians and forcing them to flee
from their homes.
Id. at 1.
83 See UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 23.
84 Exercise of Authority, supra note 72.
85 See Notice of Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 9958 (Mar. 6, 2007).
86 ABANDONING THE PERSECUTED, supra note 21, at 2.
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ruary 2006, the DHS reported that 512 asylum cases were on hold
because of the material support issue.87  Over a year later in 2007,
621 affirmative cases remained on hold due to the material support
bar.88
B. Duress-exemption Waivers Present No Clear Procedures
It is likely that otherwise eligible asylum seekers waiting in de-
tention facilities on material support grounds89 will have difficulty
accessing waivers because there is no clear mechanism available for
requesting a waiver.  In March 2007, Asylum Headquarters for the
USCIS stated:
CIS may go forward on a handful of [material support] cases
and grant [waivers] even before the procedures are finalized.
HQ has been in discussion with DHS, ICE, etc. to figure out
options for getting EOIR cases from the immigration judges to
CIS to consider the waiver, but there are many options and
models being discussed and no decision has been made.90
Initially, the USCIS issued two memorandums on processing cases
involving material support, but neither memo indicates how mate-
rial support cases will be referred from the immigration courts to
the USCIS.91  In March 2008, the USCIS directed adjudicators to
withhold adjudication of cases that may be eligible for the Secre-
tary’s exemptions,92 but this memo included few details about refu-
gee access to the review process.  Similarly, otherwise eligible
refugees slated for resettlement in the United States have limited
access to an administrative review process.  Thus, since the advent
87 UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 23, at 14 (citing USCIS Headquarters
Asylum Meeting with Community-Based Organizations (Nov. 8, 2005)).
88 See Asylum Headquarters/NGO Liaison Meeting, supra note 75.
89 See Press Release, Human Rights First, HRF: Congress Must Fix “Material Sup-
port” Laws, Stop Treating Victims Like Terrorists (May 2, 2007), [hereinafter Con-
gress Must Fix “Material Support”], http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/etn/
2006/statement/260/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
90 Asylum Headquarters/NGO Liaison Meeting, supra note 75.
91 USCIS Memorandum, May, supra note 80; Interoffice Memorandum, Processing
of Asylum Division Cases Involving Material Support, U.S. Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services (June 1, 2007) available at http://www.rcusa.org/uploads///pdfs/CIS%
20Memo,%20Asylum%20MS%20Processing,%206-1-07.pdf.
92 Interoffice Memorandum, Withholding Adjudication and Review of Prior De-
nial of Certain Categories of Cases Involving Association with, or Provision of Material
Support to, Certain Terrorist Organizations or Other Groups, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (Mar. 26, 2008) available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/native
documents/Withholding_26Mar08.pdf.
“[U]ntil further notice adjudicators are to withhold adjudication of cases in which the
only ground(s) for referral or denial is a terrorist-related inadmissibility provision(s)
. . . .” Id.
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of the material support bar, the UNHCR, the international organi-
zation mandated with facilitating the resettlement of refugees
around the world to safe third countries,93 has “simply stopped re-
ferring [resettlement] cases to the United States.”94
While the memos do not clarify how asylum seekers and refu-
gees can access waiver review, they do make a half-hearted attempt
to flesh out the criteria for determining waiver applicability.95  To
direct the USCIS in its implementation of the waivers, the DHS
provided the USCIS with four criteria.  First, the applicant must be
“seeking a benefit of protection under the Act and [must have]
been determined to be otherwise eligible for the benefit of protec-
tion.”96  Like the INA’s “material support”—its statutory counter-
part97—this memo does not define its key term, “otherwise
eligible,” leaving it unclear as to whether applicants who are al-
ready in removal proceedings would be considered otherwise eligi-
ble.98  Second, the refugee must also pass certain background and
security checks.99  These “relevant” checks are not named or other-
wise referenced100 and the lack of guidance may give the USCIS a
blank check to deny refugee protection.  Third, the refugee must
have fully disclosed the nature and circumstances of each provision
of material support and fourth, pose no danger to the United
States.101
The Department of Homeland Security has also provided the
USCIS with a host of “duress-related” factors102 to “inform” its gate-
93 UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES RESETTLEMENT Handbook:  Depart-
ment of International Protection, ch. 1 (2004), http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PRO-
TECTION/46f7c0ee2.pdf.  “The 1950 UNCHR statute states that UNHCR ‘shall
assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the
United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of
seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting Governments . . . to
facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new
national communities.’ ”  Id. at 2 n.2 (emphasis original).
94 See Anna Huskara, Op-Ed, For Refugees, Duress Waiver Not Enough, SOUTH FLORIDA
SUN-SENTINEL, June 30, 2007, at 21A; see also Hearing on Material Support Bar: Denying
Refuge to the Persecuted? Before the S. Comm. on Human Rights & Law of the S. Judiciary
Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Bishop Thomas G. Wenski, consultant to
the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Migration).
95 See USCIS Memorandum, May, supra note 80.
96 Exercise of Authority, supra note 72.
97 See U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, supra note 24.
98 The Interoffice Memorandum does not provide further guidance or explana-
tion about the criteria. See USCIS Memorandum, May, supra note 80.
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keeping role.  The USCIS officer must consider “whether the appli-
cant reasonably could have avoided, or took steps to avoid, provid-
ing material support.”103  Similar to “duress” under the Model
Penal Code, this factor employs a reasonable-person analysis.104
Yet, unlike the Model Penal Code, which permits some subjectiv-
ity—at minimum, consideration of a person’s age, strength, and
health105—here, as noted by the Secretary’s Exercise of Authority,
subjectivity should only come into play where an applicant received
“threats alone.”106  In such cases, the officer may consider “the per-
ceived imminence of the harm threatened and the perceived likeli-
hood that the harm would be inflicted.”107  This effectively
diminishes access to the waiver for the number of refugees whose
experience of duress stems from association—such as an imputed
political opinion, ethnicity, or membership in a particular social
group—instead of by a direct or targeted threat.108  Additionally,
the individual officer may consider “the severity and type of harm
inflicted or threatened and, to whom the harm was directed.”109
However, the Secretary has yet to provide guidance for determin-
ing when harm or a threat rises to a level of inducing duress.
DHS did not stop there, however.  It provided another set of
factors for the USCIS to use when weighing the totality of circum-
stances for duress-based exemptions.110  The officer may consider
the “amount, type and frequency of the material support provided,
the nature of the activities committed by the terrorist organization,
the alien’s awareness of those activities, the length of time since
material support was provided, the alien’s conduct since that time,
and any other relevant factors.”111
103 Id.
104 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 584 (West Group
2003) (1999) (“Model Penal Code § 2.09 measures the defendant’s conduct against
the standard of ‘a person of reasonable firmness.’ ”).
105 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, cmt. to
§ 2.09 at 375 (1985).
106 Exercise of Authority, supra note 72.
107 Id. (emphasis added).
108 UNHCR, THE HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFU-
GEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES (1992), available at www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58e13b4.pdf.
The Handbook also acknowledges the importance of the applicant’s subjective fear
when evaluating whether the applicant meets the refugee definition. Id.  UNHCR,
the entity responsible for the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, asserts that
“[s]ince fear is subjective, the [refugee] definition involves a subjective element in the
person applying for recognition as a refugee.” Id.
109 Exercise of Authority, supra note 72.
110 Id.
111 Id.
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III. SPINNING A WIDER WEB FOR “OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE” REFUGEES
To date, there are few decisions discussing or interpreting the
material support.  The three most prominent appellate decisions
are In re S-K-,112 decided by the BIA in June of 2006; Singh-Kaur v.
Ashcroft,113 decided by the Third Circuit in 2004; and Choub v. Gon-
zales,114 decided by the Ninth Circuit in August 2007. At the time
those cases were decided, there were no waivers available. Never-
theless, so few material support cases exist not because most refu-
gees fall outside of the material support bar’s wide sweep, but,
rather, because so many refugees fall within it.115  Otherwise eligi-
ble asylum seekers wait in vain in detention facilities on material
support grounds.116  It is unlikely that they have heard of the waiv-
ers and, even if they have representation on the outside advocating
on their behalf, there is no clear mechanism available for request-
ing a waiver.
In light of the criteria and factors discussed in the previous
section, all three appellate decisions—Choub v. Gonzales,117 Sing-
Kaur v. Ashcroft,118 and In re S-K-119—which originally denied asy-
lum and withholding of removal relief to the applicants, would
likely be deemed to be ARBITRARY IF THE CURRENT WAIVER PROVI-
SIONS WERE APPLIED TODAY.
A. In re S-K-
The administration has failed to create procedures to deal
with the many waiver-eligible cases in removal proceedings,120 such
as the case of Ma San Kwye.121  Ma San Kwye was barred from asy-
lum and withholding of removal by an immigration judge in 2005
for having contributed $1,100 Singapore dollars over an eleven
112 23 I. & N. Dec. 936 (B.I.A. 2006).
113 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004).
114 No. 04-74189, 2007 WL 2316919 (9th Cir. 2007).
115 According to the Asylum Headquarters Office, there are 621 affirmative cases,
1,491 adjustment applications of refugees, 3,699 adjustment applications of asylees,
and relative petitions on hold due to the material support bar.  Asylum Headquar-
ters/NGO Liaison Meeting, supra note 75.
116 Congress Must Fix “Material Support,” supra note 89.
117 No. 04-74189, 2007 WL 2316919 (9th Cir. 2007).
118 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004).
119 23 I. & N. Dec. 936 (B.I.A. 2006).
120 Hearing on Material Support Bar: Denying Refuge to the Persecuted? Before the S. Comm.
on Human Rights & Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Jennifer Daskal of Human Rights Watch), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/
2007/09/19/usint16941_txt.htm [hereinafter Daskal Statement].
121 In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936 (B.I.A. 2006).
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month period to the Chin National Front (“CNF”).122
San Kwye came to the United States from Burma to flee perse-
cution and torture for her religious and ethnic-minority member-
ship as a Christian Chin.  As noted by the BIA, the Burmese
government (a military dictatorship controlled by Burma’s largest
ethnic group) regularly commits human rights abuses against peo-
ple of San Kwye’s ethnic and religious background.123  Indeed, San
Kwye’s family had been tormented by the Burmese military: the
military arrested and detained her brother and killed her fiancé.124
In 2001, following her fiancé’s murder, San Kwye became ac-
quainted with one of her late fiancé’s friends, who was an under-
cover agent with the CNF.125
The CNF, a known organization in Burma that advocates for
democracy and freedom of ethnic Chin people, pledges to use
force only in self-defense, and is allied with the National League of
Democracy, which both the United Nations and United States have
recognized as the legitimate representative of the Burmese peo-
ple.126  Understandably, given her family’s suffering, San Kwye
wanted to support the CNF’s goals to secure freedom for the eth-
nic Chin and democracy for Burma.  She donated money to the
organization over the course of an eleven-month period and on
one occasion provided her late fiancé’s friend with a camera and
binoculars.127  These items were ultimately confiscated by the Bur-
mese military, which also unearthed a letter written by San Kwye to
the friend.128  Following a raid on San Kwye’s home, the friend
strongly advised her to flee Burma as soon as possible, warning her
that the Burmese military will torture anyone associated with a
known member of the CNF and confirming for San Kwye that the
military would know that she had provided the camera and binocu-
lars.129  At the time of the raid, San Kwye was working in Singa-
pore.130  Once her temporary work visa expired, however, she knew
122 Id.
123 Id. at 937.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 939 (noting Respondent’s testimony from the Assistant Secretary of
State, in which he describes the Burmese military as a “group of thugs,” and the Bur-
mese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, 117 Stat. 864, which
names the National League of Democracy—to which the CNF is aligned—as the legit-
imate representative of the Burmese people).
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that her only option was to flee to a new country and ask for
refuge.131
Since San Kwye’s denial of relief, the Secretary of Homeland
Security has included the CNF on its group-based waiver list.132
Nevertheless, San Kwye was not granted a waiver.  On March 9,
2007, the Attorney General directed the BIA to refer to him its
decision in In re S-K- along with three other cases involving similar
applicants, only to remand the case to the Board  in September
2007 to “consider what, if any, further proceedings are appropriate
in light of the Secretary’s February 20, 2007 determination.”133
The Attorney General added that his action in no way affects the
precedential nature of the Board’s conclusions in its earlier deci-
sion with respect to “the applicability and interpretation of the ma-
terial support provisions in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the
Act.”134  The courts can only provide limited relief because the ma-
terial support bar prevents the adjudicators from providing relief
to refugees who should be eligible without a waiver by the execu-
tive.  The material bar forces the refugee’s determination into the
arbitrary and political waiver process.
In the BIA’s original decision, it repeatedly stressed in several
footnotes that San Kwye should be eligible for a waiver.135 The con-
131 Id.
132 Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Statement by Homeland Se-
curity Secretary Michael Chertoff on the Intention to Use Discretionary Authority for
Material Support to Terrorism (Jan. 19, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xnews/releases/pr_1169465766808.shtm.
133 In re S-K, 24 I & N Dec. 289, 290 (A.G. Sept. 14, 2007); see also Attorney General
Remands Matter of S-K- to B.I.A., 84 No. 38 Interpreter Releases 2245 (Oct. 1, 2007).
134 Id. at 291.
135 The court stated:
[W]e do tend to agree with the D.H.S.’s assertion during oral argument
that the new waiver provisions apply to this case . . . we believe it un-
likely that Congress intended to create a gap in which there would be
no waiver available for asylum cases pending prior to the effective date
of the REAL ID Act.
In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941 n.4; see also id. at 942 n.6 (“We note that the
ultimate outcome of the respondent’s case is still undetermined in light of her ability
to apply for a waiver.”).
[W]hile the Immigration Judges and the Board do not have the author-
ity to grant the respondent or similarly situated aliens discretionary
waiver, other officials, including the Secretary of State, prior to the insti-
gation of removal proceedings, or the Secretary of Homeland Security,
at any time upon consultations with other agency officials; have been
granted this power.  We find no reason to assume they will not act con-
sistently with our international treaty obligations in exercising their
power to grant such a waiver. Id. at 943 n.7; id. at 946 n.14 (“D.H.S. also
indicated that once granted deferral of removal under the Convention
Against Torture, the respondent may be eligible for a . . . [waiver].”).
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curring opinion explained this point poignantly:
We are finding that a Christian member of the ethnic Chin mi-
nority in Burma, who clearly has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted by one of the more repressive governments in the
world, one that the United States Government views as illegiti-
mate, is ineligible to avail herself for asylum despite posing no
threat to the security of this country . . . I suggest that DHS may
consider this respondent as someone to whom the grant of such
a waiver is appropriate.136
At the time of the BIA’s initial decision, San Kwye clearly qualified
for asylum;137 nevertheless, it is unclear whether she would satisfy
the “threshold requirements” in light of the waiver criteria.  Specif-
ically, under the waiver, the applicant must have passed security
checks.138
She may face obstacles under the second requirement, that
she pass security checks.  “The administration will not issue any
Tier I and Tier II waivers until it has completed an intelligence
assessment of the group.”139  The administration claims that this
assessment is needed to help the adjudicators understand the
group’s general practices and better assess the refugee or asylum
seeker’s claim of duress.140  This explanation holds little weight
though as, under a group-based determination, which requires the
same security assessment, discretionary authority is available regard-
less of whether the support was provided under duress.141
Almost a year and a half after the BIA urged the Administra-
tion to use its waiver authority to grant San Kwye relief, a year after
Secretary of State Rice issued a waiver for Chin refugees from
Burma, and nine months after Secretary Chertoff announced the
Tier III waiver,142 San Kwye still had not been granted a waiver.
Meanwhile, the situation in Burma has become increasingly
violent.  As Tom Malinowski, Advocacy Director of Human Rights
136 Id. at 947 (Osuna, Acting Vice Chairman, concurring).
137 Id. at 937 (stating “the Immigration Judge found that the respondent had estab-
lished a well-founded fear of persecution in order to qualify for asylum”).
138 See USCIS Memorandum, May, supra note 80, at 3–4.  The remaining criteria
are: the applicant must (a) be eligible for protection, (b) have “fully disclosed, in all
relevant applications and interviews with U.S. Government representatives and
agents, the nature and circumstances of each provision of such material support,” and
(c) pose no danger to the security of the United States.  Id.
139 Daskal Statement, supra note 120.
140 Id.
141 USCIS Memorandum, May, supra note 80.
142 For a chronology of events, visit the Refugee Council USA’s webpage on Refu-
gee Waivers, http://www.rcusa.org/index.php?page=refugee-waivers (last visited Sept.
16, 2008).
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Watch in Washington recently expressed in an October 2007 arti-
cle, “We should have no illusions about what is going on in Burma.
Soldiers are hunting down leaders of the protest movement and
torturing them.  Revered Buddhist monasteries are being occu-
pied; the monks are being defrocked, beaten and sometimes killed
. . . .  People are afraid.”143  Finally, in March of 2008 the BIA
granted a waiver based on the Secretary’s designation and the Con-
gress’s action to remove Chin National Front from the terrorist
list.144
But the interpretation of material support provision remained
and, indeed, was confirmed by the BIA.  Notably the BIA stated
that the decision was based on the Secretary’s and congressional
action—not a re-interpretation of the material support.145  Thus,
its initial assertion “which set out parameters for addressing the
material support bar for asylum and withholding of removal” re-
mained law.146 The material support bar would continue to be ap-
plied broadly.
B. Choub v. Gonzales
Choub v. Gonzales was decided on August 14, 2007, roughly six
months after Secretary Chertoff announced the group-based and
duress waivers.  However, since he had been placed in removal pro-
ceedings prior to issuance of the waivers on October 21, 2002,
Choub did not have the benefit of the waivers.147  Like San Kwye,
Samnang Choub was denied asylum and withholding of removal,
but found eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”).148  Deferral of removal under CAT is a
subsidiary form of relief reserved for individuals who would likely
be subject to torture, but who are nevertheless ineligible for with-
holding of removal.149  A less desirable form of relief, deferral of
143 Tom Malinowski, No Longer the Generals’ Burma, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 21,
2007, at B7.
144 In re S-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 475 (B.I.A. 2008).  Congress passed the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, which essentially codified Secretary
Chertoff’s previously issued waivers. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008,
§ 691(b), Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2365 (enacted Dec. 26, 2007).
145 Id. at 477–78.  (“We accordingly clarify that our decision in Matter of S-K- still
applies to determinations involving the applicability and interpretation of the mate-
rial support provisions in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the [INA].”); see also In re S-
K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 290–91.
146 Id. at 477.
147 Choub v. Gonzalez, No. 04-74189, 2007 WL 2316919, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 14,
2007).
148 Id.
149 News Release, Immigration Court Process in the U.S. Removal Proceedings,
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removal under CAT can be terminated more easily than withhold-
ing of removal and does not protect the beneficiary from being
detained by the DHS.150
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the BIA’s finding that
Samnang’s activities—“supplying information to Cambodian Free-
dom Fighters (“CFF”) about the Cambodian government’s plans to
arrest CFF members and about the strength of Cambodia military
in certain areas”151—constituted material support.  Samnang never
denied providing information to Cambodian Freedom Fighters
(“CFF”) but did assert that during immigration court proceedings,
“[w]hen, how, and to exactly whom he provided this information,
and what if any possible effects this information had upon the op-
eration were not asked [of him].”152  Interestingly, the answer to
these questions are all now highly relevant for the purposes of the
waiver, as discussed further below.
The Ninth Circuit categorized CFF as a Tier III terrorist organ-
ization, briefly noting that “the group has undertaken activities . . .
in an effort to overthrow the Cambodian government.”153  Since
CFF is not one of the eight organizations under the group-based
exemptions, Samnang’s only possibility for relief would be the du-
ress-exemption waiver.  However, Choub’s case is lacking one key
fact:  duress.
Samnang did not experience duress; rather, when a friend
told him about CFF and its goals of freedom and democracy, he
voluntarily joined the organization.154  He states that he was not
involved with the mission to overthrow the Cambodian govern-
ment, but, nonetheless, politically supported CFF’s efforts to free
Cambodia from its totalitarian regime.155  Moreover, Samnang
would never be able to meet the elements of asylum if the latter
were not true.
Had CFF been on the administration’s list of group-based ex-
emptions, Samnang would not have had to show duress.156  It is
unclear why Secretary Rice would issue a group-based waiver for
Bond Redeterminations, Asylum, Convention Against Torture, Exec. Office for Immi-
gration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 28, 2005) (on file with author).
150 Choub, 2007 WL 2316919, at *1.
151 Id.
152 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 13, Choub v. Ashcroft, 2007 WL 2316919 (9th Cir.
2007) (No. 04-74189) (referring to the Administrative Record) [hereinafter Peti-
tioner’s Opening Brief].
153 Choub, 2007 WL 2316919, at *1.
154 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 152, at 13.
155 Id.
156 USCIS Memorandum, May, supra note 80, at 2.
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individuals who had provided material support to the CNF, but not
for individuals who supported the CFF given the groups’ demo-
cratic goals.  The Secretary’s decision highlights how refugees are
subject to an arbitrary process to be eligible for group based ex-
emptions.  Even the Ninth Circuit drew on the parallel between
these organizations in its decision, but ultimately found it unper-
suasive.  The court stated, “The fact that [Samnang] Choub and
the CFF claim to be motivated by their desire to advance democ-
racy in Cambodia is immaterial” and then cited language from In re
S-K- discussing the CNF: “Congress intentionally drafted the terror-
ist bars . . . to include even those people described as ‘freedom
fighters. . . .”157  Indeed, had Samnang provided the same assis-
tance to the CNF, he would be eligible for a waiver and able to
attain refugee status.  This incongruity demonstrates that the
breath of the bar coupled with the exemption process leads to the
arbitrary exclusion of eligible refugees.
Samnang, an otherwise eligible refugee,158 would clearly be
unable to demonstrate duress and, therefore, has no waiver possi-
bility.  Putting the official criteria for waiver aside for a moment, is
Samnang really the kind of individual the United States should
want to exclude?  Samnang wants to help bring democracy to his
country, which is currently run by a government with an abysmal
human rights record.159  CFF, his membership organization, is an
anti-communist organization with the mission of bringing peace to
Cambodia.160  Ironically, CFF is a registered Californian non-profit
organization.161  The administration’s piecemeal and random se-
lection of organizations is yet another cruel and illogical distinc-
tion embedded in the material support bar, and Samnang is yet
another victim.
C. Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft.
Refugees from India are the second largest group affected by
the material support bar.162  The vast numbers of people affected
by conflicts, such as the attack on Golden Temple, and the com-
plex nature of these conflicts have caused a large number of Indian
157 Choub, 2007 WL 2316919, at *1.
158 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 152, at 14–18 (discussing Choub’s
asylum eligibility).
159 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2008 255–59 (2008), available at http://
www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k8/pdfs/wr2k8_web.pdf.
160 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 152, at 19.
161 Id.
162 Asylum Headquarters/NGO Liaison Meeting, supra note 75.
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refugees to fall into the material support web.  Charangeet Singh
Kaur is one such refugee.  His story, yet again, demonstrates that
the waivers are not enough to adequately protect genuine refugees.
Charangeet was born into a Sikh family in Punjab, India.  As a
youth, he joined the Babbar Khalsa Group and the Sant Jarnail
Singh Bhindrawala Militant Group (“Bhindrawala Group”).163
Babbar Khalsa was created to protect and promote the Sikh faith,
while the Bhindrawala Group was created to fight for and protect
religious and political cause of Sikh community.164  After what the
BBC called “one of the most momentous events in modern Indian
history—the storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the holi-
est shrine of the Sikh religion, by the Indian army”165—Charangeet
joined several Sikh organizations, along with thousands of Sikh
young men both in India and abroad.  As one Sikh-American
recalls:
I was 13 years old at that time in the United States and remem-
ber the rallying of Sikhs in America to help in any way possible. I
recall my parents crying like children, demonstrating in front of
the United Nations and Indian Consulate in NYC. . . . I remem-
ber my Sikh friends joining the cause in Washington DC . . . I
remember the forming of Khalistan organizations and meeting
leaders of the movement. It is most horrific [sic] period in In-
dia’s modern time that unfortunately the world really is not
aware of.  It was a period that was responsible for changing the
perception of Sikhs. Before this time people would make sure
they sat their families next to Sikhs on the trains and buses of
India for safety. After this period they sat as far away from them
as possible and questioned if they were terrorists.166
Despite the widespread violence aimed at Sikhs, the State De-
partment’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
concluded that, for the purposes of asylum, the Indian government
did not “persecute” Sikhs for mere affiliation with an organiza-
tion.167  To conclude otherwise would open the floodgates to Sikh
asylum seekers.  Instead, the government found “persecution” only
where the asylum applicants could show that the police targeted
them for their involvement in specific violent acts.168  To meet this
163 Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 2004).
164 Id.
165 Golden Temple attack—your memories, BBC NEWS, June 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3754489.stm (last visited 12/4/08).
166 Id.
167 Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 295.
168 Id.
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standard, however, an applicant such as Charangeet signals his or
her own inadmissibility under the material support bar.
Indeed, Charangeet disclosed in an affidavit supporting his
asylum application that the police began to target him because, in
addition to participating in demonstrations and organizational ac-
tivities of the group, he assisted the freedom fighters by giving shel-
ter to those militants who physically moved weapons from village to
village.169  In a subsequent affidavit, he further explained that, as a
member of the group, he “was expected to make charitable contri-
butions to the community, including ‘provision of food and assis-
tance to the poor.’ ”170  Charangeet testified,
We—I used to help by putting that tent and organize the
mondo or the tent . . . . I never kept any weapons.  Those Sikhs
who were baptized, they used to come and they knew that I am
also baptized and I just help them with the—giving them
food.171
The Third Circuit was unmoved by the fact that Charangeet
had never participated in any violence and that the meetings at
which he sheltered militants were for the purpose of religious cere-
mony.  The court denied his admission under the material support
bar.172  Today, despite the Secretary’s exercise of his waiver author-
ity, a court would still likely deny admission to Charangeet (like
San Kwye and Choub) for material support reasons.  In its deci-
sion, the Third Circuit demonstrated some hesitancy in articulat-
ing to which organizational tier Charangeet had provided
support.173  However, a court today would easily hold that any of
the Sikh groups that Charangeet participated in was “a group of
two or more individuals”174 with intent to threaten or “endanger,
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 296.
172 Id. at 300–01.
173 Id. at 297–98.  The Court of Appeals considered,
None of the organizations to which Sing belonged, including Babbar
Khalsa, are among the thirty-six Foreign Terrorist Organizations desig-
nated by the United States Department of State in accordance with INA
§ 219 . . . Babbar Khalsa and the International Sikh Youth Federation,
however, were named by the Department of Treasury . . . as Specially
Designated Terrorist.
We need, not, however . . . consider whether Babba Khalsa, Sant Jarnail
Singh, the International Sikh Youth Federation or any other group was
a terrorist organization within the meaning of INA
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc) or (dd).
Id.
174 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(2006).
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directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to
cause substantial damage to property”175 and, hence, would be con-
sidered a Tier III terrorist organization under the INA.
Since none of Charangeet’s groups are on the group-exemp-
tion list, his only potential waiver is through a duress exemption.
Yet, duress is a flexible concept vulnerable to the subjectivity of the
individual adjudicator.  The February pronouncement176 does not
define duress, although it does provide factors to help the USCIS
officers make a determination.  Black’s Law Dictionary lists three
definitions for duress.177  The first and third178 definitions derive
from tort and criminal law, respectively.  However, the second defi-
nition has a broader applicability “a threat of harm made to com-
pel a person to do something against his or her own will or
judgment.”179  According to this definition, Charangeet could have
experienced duress as a result of the continual threat of violence
by the government.  This threat may have, in turn, compelled him
to support Sikh groups.  While this is unlikely the kind of “duress”
contemplated by the Exercise of Authority, the language of the
pronouncement does not exclude this interpretation.
The waiver requires that the duress be the catalyst for the pro-
vision of material support to the terrorist organization but not that
the terrorist organization necessarily be the source of the duress.180
Another entity, such as a government or militia, could be the
source of the threat of harm driving the individual’s belief that it is
necessary to support a group that works against the threat of harm.
Charangeet might argue that he joined Sikh groups because
of the great threat of harm Sikhs experienced around the time of
the 1984 government attack on the most important Sikh holy site.
As Charangeet explained in testimony through an interpreter,
“When the Indian troops attacked the holy shrine of the Sikh com-
munity (the Golden Temple), killing members of the Sant Jarnail
group, he, among others joined Babbar Khalsa.”181
175 § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
176 Notice of Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 9958 (Mar. 6, 2007).
177 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 426.
178 Id. (“1. Strictly, the physical confinement of a person or the detention of a con-
tracting party’s property.  In the field of torts, duress is considered a species of fraud
in which compulsion takes the place of deceit in causing injury. . . . 3. The use or
threatened use of unlawful force—usu. that a reasonable person cannot resist—to
compel someone to commit an unlawful act.”).
179 Id.
180 See Exercise of Authority, supra note 72.
181 Brief of Petitioner at 5-6, Singh-Kaur v. INS, 385 F.3d. 293 (3d Cir. 2003) (No.
03-1766).
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Additionally, Charangeet would have good reasons to feel
threatened.  Kanwarpal Singh Bittoo, a Sikh man, who was a young
student at Amritsar’s Khalsa College on the night of June 5, 1984,
described the fear and dread he experienced on the night of the
attack:
[It] seemed like the end of the world had come. . . . We sat
huddled together inside our homes as a never-ending succes-
sion of explosions and continuous gunfire ripped through the
night. It was dark and terribly humid. The electric supply had
been shut down and all telephone lines had been cut. Then sud-
denly, on the morning of June 6, a deathly silence enveloped
the old city. Rumours circulated wildly. . . . “[T]he Indian army
has destroyed the Golden Temple.”182
Moreover, the threat Charangeet experienced as a young Sikh liv-
ing in Punjab in the mid-eighties eventually actualized.  One night,
the police dragged him out of the house and began to beat him
mercilessly with riot sticks.183  The police detained Charangeet for
over a week.184  Upon his release, he tried to protect his family
from the police by staying away from his home and living on the
streets.185  After he was arrested for a second time, it was clear that
he needed to flee.186
In light of this expanded notion of duress, even if the USCIS
were to accept such an argument—which is doubtful, as it begins
to sound too much like an asylum analysis187—the USCIS can still
use the duress factors and its discretion to find an otherwise eligi-
ble refugee inadmissible.188  In Charangeet’s case, there would be
several potentially detrimental factors.  The USCIS might decide
that Charangeet could have reasonably avoided or taken steps to
avoid providing the material support.189  Similar to the “internal
flight alternative” doctrine,190 a USCIS officer might expect an ap-
182 Kanwarpal Singh, Flashbacks Golden Temple Attacks, BBC NEWS, June 3, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3774693.stm (last visited Dec. 4, 2008).




187 See, e.g., John S. Kane, Refining Chevron—Restoring Judicial Review to Protect Relig-
ious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513 (2008).
188 See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz & Philip Schrag, Refugee Rou-
lette:  Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007).
189 USCIS Memorandum, May, supra note 80.
190 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
provides “internal relocation” (i.e. asylum-seeker’s ability to avoid persecution in his
or her home country by relocating to another area of that country) as a guideline for
the exercise of discretion in determining an applicant’s eligibility for asylum status.
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plicant to first try to relocate to another state in India.  In addition,
his awareness of the “terrorist” organization’s activities might be
another detrimental factor.
The duress exemption’s breath is potentially beneficial for ref-
ugees but the discretion of the USCIS factors coupled with the un-
derlying policy of the material support provision make the waiver
an empty vessel.  These cases demonstrate that the waiver system is
applied arbitrarily because it fails to take account of the context of
the individual refugees’ support, and that the material support pro-
vision will continue to dictate the fate of these refugees.
CONCLUSION:  THE PROMISE OF PROTECTION
Today, even with the new waivers in place, not all bona fide
refugees and asylum seekers will be protected.  Colombian refu-
gees who are the most frequently represented nationality with cases
on hold for material support reasons are not on the list, nor are
refugees from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines, the
next biggest groups affected by the material support bar.191  Their
chances of accessing the general waiver are slim, given the role and
expanse of the discretionary factors.
The waivers are yet another illusory promise made by the
United States government for the sake of appearance.  In reality,
they provide the United States government with another tool for
making cruel distinctions that keep genuine refugees from being
granted status or sanctuary.  Only a legislative fix that addresses the
indiscriminate nature of the material support issue will disentangle
refugees from the web.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–208, 110 Stat. 3009; see Procedures for Asylum and Witholding of Removal, 8
C.F.R. § 208 (1998).
191 Asylum Headquarters/NGO Liaison Meeting, supra note 75.

